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Guest Editorial

On Method, Technorealism and
Aesthetic Capitalism
Patricia Ticineto Clough

In the introduction to a collection of essays discussing both Gilles
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida's writings, the editors, Paul Patton and John Potevi
refer to Michel Foucault's well-known comment indicating that the 20th century
perhaps one day would be seen as Deleuzian. I am particularly interested in the
comment that Patton and Potevi report Deleuze made when asked to respond to
Foucault's remark. As Deleuze put it: "He may perhaps have meant that I was the
most na'ive philosopher of our generation. In all of us you find themes like multiplicity,
difference, repetition. But I put forward almost raw concepts of these, while others
work with more mediation ... Maybe that's what Foucault meant: I wasn't better
than the others, but more na'ive, producing a kind of art brut, so to speak, not the
most profound but the most innocent philosopher (the one who felt the least guilt
about 'doing philosophy.')1
I begin with this story about Deleuze not merely to mark the influence that that
generation of philosophers, Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault's generation, has had on
my work as a social theorist and cultural critic. Not your generation and not quite
mine, that generation of philosophers already were becoming known intellectuals
by the post-World War II years and thus they shared a certain readiness when
the days of 1968 would turn out to be eventful for their unique elaborations of
philosophy, indeed hardly recognized as such. Their writings might have been more
readily recognized as the work of social theorists and cultural critics. Yet having been
introduced to the English speaking academy through literary studies, art history,
architecture, film, television, and new media criticism, it would be a circuitous
route to recognition in the social sciences. Indeed, Deleuze who was translated into
English mostly in the 1990's is still or only now receiving the attention of English
speaking social scientists.
But if it were not only to point to the influence of these philosophers
on my thinking as a social theorist and cultural critic, why else did I start as I did.
It was to extend an invitation to you to be na·ive, to be open to the creation of
'almost raw concepts,' to be social theorists and with less guilt to be philosophical,
politically engaged, as a new generation of sociologists needs to be, no matter what
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your focus of study comes to be. So first let me address what I mean in inviting
you to be social theorists, even while not necessarily inviting you to specialize in
sociological theory. By inviting you to become social theorists, I mean to encourage
you to develop a critical capacity that can accompany you in whatever work you
do as a sociologist. More specifically I mean to invite you to engage in on-ongoing
exploration of the method with which you come to reading, writing, thinking,
feeling, knowing. You might suspect that what I am proposing is about reflexivity,
self-reflexivity or the exploration of a self through a self-consciousness, to take a
personal or autobiographical turn in relationship to doing sociology, and there is
something to that to which I will return. But actually I mean to provoke thought about
autobiography in order to address something like the autobiography of sociology,
what might better be called a genealogy of sociology's reflexivity, its consciousness
and self-consciousness.
I want to point to what George Steinmetz has called sociology's
"epistemological unconscious," a term he used in arguing that even though
vigorously denied, sociology still is methodologically positivistic meaning that the
play of various combinations of positivism, empiricism and scientism serves as
sociological method's "center of gravity." 2 I am reminded too of Michel Foucault who
pointed to the productivity of what he called a "positive unconscious of knowledge,"
arguing that the doing of a science is made possible by what cannot be thought in
the terms of that science. 3 So I hope to point to the importance of methodological
considerations in producing a sociological imagination for our times -first by drawing
out the implication of the disavowed operation of a methodological positivism in
sociology while at the same time stepping back from long held assumptions about
the opposition between the subjective and the objective in the often battled-over
claims that something is unscientific in being merely subjective, on one hand, and
on the other, that the claim to objectivity is merely a blind subjectivism without
any accountability, especially political accountability, such that the claim to being
non- political in work is often taken by others in fact to be political . I hope you will
consider with me that these battles and reversals around subjective and objective
are a visible trace on the surface of sociology's epistemological unconscious or its
methodological positivism--a surface we might refer to as style or writing style.
Actually although Steinmetz never fully discusses it, he does propose that scientism
in the trio, positivism empiricism and scientism, refers to the style of presentation in
Sociology, writing the surface of its epistemological unconscious.
So if I am suggesting, as I would like to do, that to rethink the sociological
imagination means creating methodologies that are neither subjective nor objective,
it is because I would like to remind you of the apparatuses of imagination, the
apparatuses of the world production and distribution of imaginaries. The screens,
machines and makers of dreams need interrogation as we are confronted with a
technology or a new media technology that has reformulated presentational style
or performativity and has done so as other media technologies have done in the
past, each in its own way by deploying a literary realism. Now if realism is the style
of presentation that produces a sense of reality existing outside our perception
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of it or proposes that our perception is only a perspective on a given reality, then
realism in the 18th century, at least in Europe, not only becomes the style of painting
and literature-the realist novel for example arises in the late eighteenth century-but realism also becomes the presentational style of a positivist empiricism. It
becomes and still is the style of Sociology through and beyond the post-World War
II years of the Fordist/Keynesian era, when social science, privileges researchers'
doing organized full fledged empirical studies, surveying populations to bring their
practices in line with mass production and mass consumption.
In the post-World War II years, Steinmetz concludes: "the muting of capitalist
crisis made it increasingly plausible that social practices really were repeatable in
ways that could be captured by statistical models and replicable experiments." 4 In
investing in the production of the statistical personage or what was then called 'the
generic American,' Sociology, in the post-World War II years, tightly tied sociality to
the individual subject as a representative of the various statistical populations that
Sociology created and that it allowed to stand in for what we refer to still as the
social structural Even C. Wright Mills who gives us a sociological imagination for his
times by aiming criticism at the very kind of research Steinmetz is describing, would
nonetheless use the statistical in pointing to the social structural and the historical:
his used examples, as you remember, such as if one man looses a job, if one couple
gets divorced, you have a personal trouble but when the divorce rate is high or the
unemployment rate is high, well then you have a social issue, a social structure
historical issue, written however in the discourse of rates and population statistics.
As Sociology writes the structural in terms of statistical populations it displaces
from the center of methodological considerations, critical theories of power/
knowledge and the aesthetics of representational practices. And further because
statistical populations are irreducible to individuals or even communities and are
rather virtual or probabilistic assemblages, there is an urge if not a compulsion for
Sociology to give a human face or figure to statistical populations, often through
ethnographic portraiture or the case study such that Sociology by intention or by
appropriation becomes more amenable to humanistic liberal or neoliberal policy
and programming.
In this same context we might consider the relatively recent fate of identity
politics-- its morph into liberal and neoliberal multicultural policy and programming.
We might think of the insistence of identity politics on the personal as political,
thereby making demands for personal recognition especially from the state, which
however had to be based on statistical or counted or accounted for populations. So
the demand for human rights, for example, usually is articulated against statistical
populations such as Blacks, Women, Queers, the incarcerated, the addicted, etc.
but also populations of problems, such as poverty, disenfranchisement criminality,
physical and mental incapacity. These two population series, brought together
through statistics and personalized ethnographic portraiture and case study, can
make it difficult to engage the critical theories I have already mentioned, concerning
power/knowledge and the aesthetics of presentation, as matters of methodology
or as a way to think critically of Sociology's place in what Foucault described as
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biopolitics or the govern mentality of liberalism and neoliberalism .
In the recently published English translations of his lectures of the late
1970's, Foucault both defines biopolitics as "this very specific albeit very complex,
power that has the population as its target, political economy as it major form of
knowledge and apparatuses of security (or dispositifs) as its essential technical
instrument," and he links biopolitics to neoliberal governance. 5 Refusing that view
of neoliberal governance as a matter of stripping away the state so as to free the
economy to pursue its true expression, or what has been called deregulation,
Foucault instead has proposed that regulatory activities of government have been
hyperactive in neoliberalism. Or as he puts it: Neoliberalism should not be identified
with laissez faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity and intervention. But
this does not mean that neoliberal governance intervenes in the economy directly
so much as governance secures the conditions of possibility of the market both by
assisting in the calibration of the market's indeterminate and non-totalizable features
to risk management and by inviting a crisis oriented sociality. These, a speculative
economy of risk and a crisis-oriented sociality, have been especially marked in the
state's participation in a production of suspicion and fear through a population racism
applied for example in the war terrorism, immigrant deportation and detention, not
to mention mass incarceration and reentry programming. All of which have led to
the consolidation of apparatuses or dispositifs for organizing, assessing and investing
life and death, understood biopolitically. So, if neoliberalism governs life and death
it does so biopolitically, that is, it artificially optimizes the generativity of species
life, or of nature generally, where species life however is taken up in terms of the
probabilities or improbabilities of the life chances of statistical populations, where
populations are not so much of human groups but populations of capacities, human
capital measures, estimations of genetic potentiality, or environmental sustainability
probabilities.
As these examples suggest biopolitical governance of life and death means
the production and management of "specific aggregate effects of populations
irreducible to a smaller frame." 6 And it is through these aggregate effects that
populations have economic effects that further induce the movement, or the activities
of populations--the further circulation of these as probabilities. Here, what I referred
to earlier as the human face or figure offered through ethnographic portraiture or
case study serve not only to humanize populations when in fact they are not human
but the human face and portraiture also help to integrate individual phenomena
within a collective field in the form of quantification. This increasingly allows for a
comparison of normalities instead of merely distinguishing between the normal and
the abnormal. With the biopolitical governance of life and death, "the normative,"
Brain Massumi has argued undergoes rapid inflation, as classificatory and regulative
mechanisms are elaborated for every socially recognizable state of being .... such that
'normal' is now free-standing, no longer the opposite and necessary complement
of 'abnormal,' 'deviant,' or 'dysfunctional,' as it was under disciplinary power ... " 7
The biopolitical governance of life and death is less disciplinary, less concerned
with producing subjects by inducing in them an adherence to the ideologies of the
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nation-state. Or at least we might say, as Foucault does, that "populations are not
to be seen from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion of subject, but as a
sort of technical political object of management and government ... dependent on a
series of variables open to manipulation and modulation." 8
Populations also do appear in the guise of "publics," that is, in the guise of
"opinions" circulating in bodies of data. 9 To be sure, publics are not the public imagined
to be engaged in discourse about or argumentation ove r narrative knowledge with
truth claims addressed to subjects of right. Publics rather point to a circulation of
ways of doing things, ways of being, opinion addressed to an audience and not even
a mass audience. And if here Foucault's description of the circulation of publics and
opinion already suggests something about the more contemporary situations of
today's media communication and information technologies, it also should be noted
that the tension between publics and the public, between addressing subjects and
circulating opinion among audiences already informed reading by the eighteenth
century when the realist novel as well as newspapers becomes popular.
But what is different about the technology that is ours today is, for one,
the havoc it has wrought on realism in that it is a technology of simulation, that is
to say, the digital production of images can be without reference to reality. Or to
put it a better way, digital imaging does not necessarily re-present; it does not even
present copies. If literary realism was meant to create a sense of a given reality
outside human perception, digital technology also is realist but it produces reality
as simulation, as information flow, not as re-presentation or copy. As such, the
digital image is in-forming: it touches and sounds, drawing attention and inviting
participation through affective attunement.
Now affect is not to be understood first and foremost as emotion or named
feelings. Rather it is the very capacity to be affected or to affect, the preconscious,
pre-individual potentiality to act and be acted upon. Its truth is felt in terms of
resonance or vibration across the dynamic matter of bodies and not only human
bodies. What is asked in terms of truth is less what a body is and more what a body
does or can do, can become, can become with other bodies. Affect refers to material
processes of becoming without or outside human perception or consciousness, since
it embodies other than human bodies only. But as for human bodies or in relationship
to human bodies, digital technology's vocation I would say is to be the body's
affective milieu, its sensational surface or skin and as such to function affectively
below human perception at the infra empirical level of bodily proprioception. I am
thinking on one hand of the ubiquity of information technologies or imaging that
digitization has made possible, and on the other, the ongoing efforts to make digital
technologies themselves able to simulate listening, touching, sounding, that is, for
digital technologies to function as affective sensate bodies much more than cognitive
subjects or artificial intelligences. I am also thinking of the more general affect of
digital simulation on life sciences, on life itself in the continuing development of
biotechnologies. And adding to that the rethinking in physics of energy matter as
in-formational, there is a configuration of mathematics, physics, biology and digital
simulation in te rms of which realism and the empirical are being rethought inviting
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us also to rethink sociological, measure and method.
To do so will require an imagination born of intense creativity. This may mean
as I have been suggesting that we rethink the imaginary or the psyche altogether.
Or to think the psychic or imaginary in terms of different techno-realisms. Each
techno-realism fixes the psyche or imaginary in a way that allows them to take up
what had to be hidden in the construction of reality, or what is referred to as of late
as the social construction of reality, where each techno-realism both relies on and
disavows the working of unconscious processes in a way that is befitting to each. So
the cinema and television are different, different in relationship to the realism each
produces and the unconscious each produces. And digital imaging also is different
and its psyche is different but it is different in that digital imagining doesn't so much
hide as function below consciousness, non-phenomenologically, in producing a
realism of simulacra. 10
Pointing to a material process or matter as dynamic process with out
human perception, the psyche of the digital finds its place in relationship to measure
and what has been described as the impossibility of measure in relationship to
the time of affect or the before or beyond human perception of pure potentiality,
an impossibility however that arises just at the very same time that digital is the
technology that means to directly be effective below and beyond consciousness, to
modulate or measure potentiality itself. So this is the problematic of politics in ou r
time . And to put this problematic in play with economy, market, and governance, let
me shift our focus a bit.
In her recent discussion of branding, Christine Harold suggests that rather
than offering a mark of subject status attached to commodities, brand now makes
things signs that exude and transmit affect or potentiality, befitting what she has
called "aesthetic capitalism". 11 Brand then is meant to function affectively, to stir
bodily propensities, or potentialities, to initiate activation through moods or feelings
in relation to a political economy. This branding seeks to produce a surplus value of
"audience effect" or affect in a political economy that embeds what Luciana Parisi
and Steven Goodman have called "the mnemonic control" of a preemptive logic. 12
For Parisi and Goodman, the operation of pre-emption through branding seeks
to remodel long term memory through an occupation of or the parasiting on the
dynamics of short-term intuition or where past present and future coexist as affect
or potentiality, which repeatedly instigates activation in the neurophysiological
plasticity of the body-brain. Branding's occupation of short term intuitions is
something like a distribution of memory implants, which provides you with the
bodily or affective sense of an experience you haven't had or a memory you haven't
had, giving a base for future activation or repetition. It is a potentiation or an
activation however that means to foreclose actualization, collapsing potentiality
back on itself producing a surplus of affect. Indeed, the power of preemptive logic
therefore points to biopower or better beyond biopower Not just the governance of
life and death but a move to that which is non lived or proceeds or goes beyond life
in order to modulate potentiality or affect-itself.
It is in relationship to these powers, gaining force in our present that, I want to
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argue, that measure and therefore method are becoming aesthetic. And when I say
measure and methods I mean the measures and methods that I have been talking
about, those belonging to sociologists and governance alike where governance
seeks its veridiction in its relationship to the conditions it provides for the market
in managing life and affect - the market of aesthetic capitalism. Measure and
method will become increasingly particular to its simulation not to a given reality.
And therefore it will be a productive measure changing what measure is each time
and what is measured each time and the units of measure each time. What goes
by performance these days will become the norm and we will have to start soon
inventing something beyond it or making more of it. By performance then I mean
a turning of knowledge production into an affective modulation of an audience, an
upping or downing of affect, a speeding or slowing of the affective register. This
does not mean ignoring research or any means of collecting data; it means that
presentation becomes more important, more central than it ever has been as a
measure of truth.
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